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CORVELLO V. WELLS FARGO BANK: LENDING 
SUPPORT FOR A NEW GENERATION OF 
HAMP LITIGATION AND MORTGAGE RELIEF 
Byron Tuyay 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA) in response to the worst economic 
recession the United States had suffered since the Great Depression.1 
A major contributor to the recession was the foreclosure crisis that 
swept the nation.2 Consequently, the centerpiece of EESA featured 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which directed the 
Secretary of the Treasury (“Treasury”) to “implement a plan that 
seeks to maximize assistance to homeowners” and to incentivize loan 
servicers of underlying mortgages to take advantage of available 
programs to minimize foreclosures.3 
In 2009, the Obama Administration unveiled the Home 
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) with the aim of curbing 
avoidable foreclosures.4 HAMP encourages loan servicers to modify 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Politics, New York 
University, May 2009. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review for their commitment to the editorial process. I am also extremely grateful to 
Professors Bryan Hull and Christopher Hawthorne for their continual guidance and 
encouragement. Finally, thanks to my family for their love and support, especially my 
grandmother, Natividad C. Roan, who was my first writing tutor. 
 1. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008); Arsen Sarapinian, Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to Enforce the Home 
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 64 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 906 (2013). 
 2. Sarapinian, supra note 1, at 906; see also Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure 
Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 570 (2009) 
(“Foreclosures also depress housing and commercial real-estate prices throughout entire 
neighborhoods[,] . . . [and] property-value declines caused by foreclosure hurt local businesses 
and erode state and local government tax bases.”) (citations omitted). 
 3. 12 U.S.C. § 5219a(a) (2012). 
 4. Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental Directive 09-01, at 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter Supplemental Directive 09-01], available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal 
/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd0901.pdf; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008) (authorizing the 
United States Department of Treasury to create and implement a plan to decrease the rate of 
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home loans to reduce monthly mortgage payments for distressed 
borrowers facing imminent foreclosure.5 Through HAMP, qualified 
borrowers may lower their monthly loan payments to 31 percent of 
their monthly income and thereby decrease their risk of foreclosure.6 
Before receiving an offer for permanent loan modification, 
however, a borrower must complete a trial payment period (TPP), 
during which the borrower preliminarily makes lower monthly 
payments on his or her mortgage while the loan servicer determines 
the borrower’s eligibility for a permanent modification through 
HAMP, based on the borrower’s personal financial information.7 
Phillip Corvello (“Corvello”) and Jeffery and Karen Lucia (“the 
Lucias”) sought permanent loan modifications through HAMP8 and 
received TPP plans from their mortgage servicer, Wells Fargo Bank 
(“Wells Fargo”).9 After the expiration of their trial periods, however, 
Corvello and the Lucias were denied offers for permanent loan 
modification.10 
Corvello and the Lucias filed separate actions against Wells 
Fargo in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction and alleging 
that California law governed their claims.11 Both complaints alleged 
that—because the plaintiffs had complied with the express terms of 
the TPP agreement—the loan servicer was bound by an enforceable 
contract to offer them permanent modifications.12 In dismissing the 
breach of contract claims, “the district court concluded that[,] 
accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true, the language of the TPP 
could not support a contract for a permanent loan modification.”13 
 
foreclosures). 
 5.  Under EESA, the term “servicer” is defined as “the person responsible for servicing of a 
loan (including the person who makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan).” 
12 U.S.C. § 5220(a)(4) (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2) (2006); Supplemental Directive 09-01, 
supra note 4, at 1; see also Sarapinian, supra note 1, at 913 (“A servicer is neither a lender nor 
investor but is often a third-party financial institution that is hired by investors to manage and 
account for the loan.”). 
 6. Making Home Affordable Program: Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages 
105–08 (2013) [hereinafter MHA Handbook], available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal 
/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_43.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 122. 
 8. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 882. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
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On appeal, Corvello’s and the Lucias’ cases were consolidated 
and the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the terms of the TPP 
agreement constituted an enforceable contract under which Wells 
Fargo was obligated to offer permanent modifications to Corvello 
and the Lucias after they satisfied their obligations under the TPP; 
the panel held that it did.14 
In Corvello, the Ninth Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s 
recent decision in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.15 by interpreting 
HAMP-related claims in favor of consumer protection.16 The Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Corvello also signals a departure from 
competing rationales adopted in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 
which prohibit individuals from enforcing TPP agreements against 
loan servicers.17 Thus, by validating contract-based TPP claims, 
Corvello strengthens plaintiff-borrowers’ claims in future Ninth 
Circuit HAMP litigation.18 
Part II of this Comment presents the historical background and 
legislative history of HAMP. In Part III, this Comment summarizes 
the relevant facts and the arguments advanced by the parties on 
appeal in Corvello. Part IV sets forth the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
its decision. Part V analyzes the significance of the holding in 
Corvello, specifically, the consequences of adopting the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation of the TPP and contract-based HAMP claims 
for distressed mortgagors in the Ninth Circuit. Finally, Part VI 
concludes that the Ninth Circuit properly upheld the plain-language 
interpretation of the TPP terms in Corvello, thereby avoiding 
injustice and serving HAMP’s legislative goals. 
II.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
After Congress passed EESA in 2008, the Treasury, acting 
under direction of Congress, launched HAMP in 2009.19 HAMP 
helps distressed homeowners that have fallen behind on monthly 
mortgage payments by establishing a process and procedure through 
which borrowers can reduce monthly mortgage payments to 
 
 14. Id. at 880–81, 883. 
 15. 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 16. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883; see infra Part V.A. 
 17. See infra Part V.A. 
 18. See infra Part V.A. 
 19. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 880. 
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approximately 31 percent of the borrower’s income.20 HAMP was 
designed to incentivize banks to refinance mortgages, thereby 
reducing foreclosures and allowing distressed borrowers to stay in 
their homes.21 
Through HAMP, the Treasury entered into Servicer 
Participation Agreements (SPAs) with the nation’s largest home-loan 
servicers.22 Under these SPAs, loan servicers are eligible to receive 
TARP funds as long as they facilitate loan modifications to prevent 
avoidable foreclosures.23 Participating loan servicers, such as Wells 
Fargo, can receive up to $1,600 in federal incentive compensation for 
each permanent loan modification offered through HAMP.24 
In April 2009, the Treasury issued the first of a series of 
directives and policies in an attempt to provide servicers with 
uniform guidance in implementing HAMP modifications.25 Under 
HAMP, qualified borrowers initiate the process of modifying their 
home loans by submitting personal financial information to their loan 
servicers.26 Before receiving a permanent loan modification, 
borrowers must pay reduced monthly mortgage payments for a trial 
period.27 At the end of the trial period, borrowers who submitted 
payments for each month during the period and whose personal 
financial representations remained accurate during that same period 
receive Modification Agreements that permanently modify the terms 
of their loans.28 
The loan servicers must report to the borrowers—regardless of 
their eligibility or ineligibility—the results of the eligibility 
 
 20. Id.; see MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 105–08. 
 21. See 12 U.S.C. § 5219a (2012). 
 22. See Sarapinian, supra note 1, at 914–15 & n.71. 
 23. Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra note 4, at 23. 
 24. Id.; Brief for Defendant-Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. at 7, Corvello v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 11-16234, 11-16242), 2012 WL 1650301, at *6–7; 
MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 140. The amount of TARP funds that a loan servicer receives 
for any given loan modification depends on the degree of the borrower’s delinquency in 
connection with the underlying mortgage. For a detailed account of the financial incentives 
offered to servicers, see Sarapinian supra note 1, at 915 n.75; 12 U.S.C. § 5219 (2012). 
 25. Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra note 4, at 1. 
 26. To qualify for HAMP, borrowers must satisfy certain threshold requirements relating to 
the date their loans were originated and other indicators of personal financial hardship. See 
Corvello, 728 F.3d at 880. 
 27. Id. at 880–81. 
 28. Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
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determinations made during the trial period.29 In the event that the 
borrowers are ineligible for permanent modifications under HAMP, 
loan servicers should also consider foreclosure prevention 
alternatives for such a borrower.30 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
“In May 2009, Corvello sought a loan modification from Wells 
Fargo because he was struggling to make his mortgage payments.”31 
Corvello received information about the permanent loan 
modification program and responded by sending an application to 
Wells Fargo, which included copies of pay stubs and other personal 
financial information.32 
Wells Fargo sent Corvello a written TPP agreement on July 17, 
2009.33 The TPP included a cover letter stating that Wells Fargo 
would modify Corvello’s loan so long as his financial information 
was accurate and he complied with the terms of the TPP.34 It read: 
If I am in compliance with this Loan Trial Period and my 
[personal financial] representations in Section 1 continue to 
be true in all material respects, then the Lender will provide 
me with a Loan Modification Agreement, as set forth in 
Section 3, that would amend and supplement (1) the 
Mortgage on the Property, and (2) the Note secured by the 
Mortgage. . . . I understand that after I sign and return two 
copies of this Plan to the Lender, the Lender will send me a 
signed copy of this Plan if I qualify for the Offer or will 
send me written notice that I do not qualify for the Offer.35 
Paragraph 2F of the TPP notified the borrower of the party’s 
obligations: 
If prior to the Modification Effective Date, (i) the Lender 
does not provide me a fully executed copy of this Plan and 
the Modification Agreement; (ii) I have not made the Trial 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 15. 
 31. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 6, Corvello, 728 F.3d 878 (Nos. 11-16234, 11-16242), 
2012 WL 1132108 at *6. 
 32. Id. at 6–7. 
 33. Id. at 7. 
 34. Id. at 7; Corvello, 728 F.3d at 881. 
 35. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 881; Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 7. 
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Period payments required under Section 2 of this Plan; or 
(iii) the Lender determines that my representations in 
Section 1 are no longer true and correct, the Loan 
Documents will not be modified and this Plan will 
terminate.36 
The TPP expressly stated that no modification would take effect 
“unless and until” Corvello received a signed copy of the 
modification agreement, but assured him that the bank would notify 
him one way or another about his eligibility for a loan 
modification.37 Accordingly, Paragraph 2G read: 
I understand that the Plan is not a modification of the Loan 
Documents and that the Loan Documents will not be 
modified unless and until (i) I meet all of the conditions 
required for modification, (ii) I receive a fully executed 
copy of a Modification Agreement, and (iii) the 
Modification Effective Date has passed.38 
Corvello sent a signed copy of the TPP agreement to Wells 
Fargo.39 He contended that, despite the performance of his 
obligations under the TPP in the subsequent three months, Wells 
Fargo never offered him a permanent modification, nor did it notify 
him that he did not qualify for the modification program.40 
Karen and Jeffrey Lucia were in a similar financial situation as 
Corvello in late 2009.41 The Lucias asserted that, during a phone 
conversation in February 2010, Wells Fargo offered them a TPP with 
the promise of a permanent modification if payments were timely 
completed, and if their financial information remained accurate 
throughout the trial period.42 After five months, however, the Lucias 
still had not received an offer for permanent modification, nor had 
they received notification that they were ineligible for HAMP.43 
 
 36. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 881–82. 
 37. Id. at 882. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 8; see also Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank 
N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Due to the economic recession, the Lucias 
lost their jobs and, struggling to make their mortgage payments, sought out a loan 
modification.”), rev’d sub nom. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 42. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 882. 
 43. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 8–9. 
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Instead, Wells Fargo terminated the TPP and foreclosed on, and 
subsequently sold, the Lucias’ home.44 
Corvello and the Lucias separately filed complaints against 
Wells Fargo in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California.45 Corvello’s and the Lucias’ complaints sought 
permanent modification of their respective home loans under 
California law.46 Their complaints alleged that Wells Fargo’s failure 
to fulfill its obligations under the TPP to either offer permanent loan 
modifications or send notification of ineligibility under HAMP 
constituted a breach of the enforceable contract that formed when the 
borrowers met their obligations under the TPP.47 Additionally, both 
complaints alleged promissory estoppel, breaches of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, violations of California’s Unfair 
Competition Law, and violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act.48 
The district court issued orders granting Wells Fargo’s motions 
to dismiss both actions.49 The court concluded in both cases that, 
accepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the language of the TPP 
“could not support a contract for permanent loan modification.”50 In 
both cases, the district court held that, under the provisions in 
Paragraph 2G, Wells Fargo’s promise to offer a permanent loan 
modification was conditioned on the bank sending the plaintiffs a 
signed Modification Agreement.51 As such, the district court 
concluded that Wells Fargo was not required to offer Corvello or the 
Lucias a permanent loan modification, since Wells Fargo never sent 
them signed Modification Agreements.52 
On appeal, Wells Fargo maintained that the district court 
properly found that the terms of the TPP did not constitute an offer 
for permanent modification.53 Relying on the language of Paragraph 
2G of the TPP, Wells Fargo argued that any subsequent offer for 
 
 44. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 882. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 882–83. 
 50. Id. at 882. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 883. 
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permanent modification did not exist “unless and until” a borrower 
received a fully executed copy of a Modification Agreement.54 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the recent Seventh 
Circuit decision in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.55 In Wigod, 
under similar facts, Wells Fargo raised the same defense that it raised 
in Corvello.56 The Seventh Circuit rejected Wells Fargo’s argument 
that Paragraph 2G of the TPP agreement precluded the existence of 
any offer for permanent modification “unless and until” the servicer 
sent the borrower a signed Modification Agreement.57 
Notably, the Seventh Circuit found that the TPP agreement 
contained sufficient consideration because it required the borrower to 
“open new escrow accounts, undergo credit counseling . . . [and] 
provide and vouch for the truth of her financial information.”58 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit held that any conditions precedent 
to Wells Fargo’s obligation to offer permanent modification were to 
be satisfied by the borrower—not by Wells Fargo.59 The Seventh 
Circuit thus concluded that, when Wigod satisfied those conditions 
(i.e., complied with the requirements of the trial plan and maintained 
accurate financial information throughout the trial period), Wells 
Fargo had a contractual obligation to offer her a permanent loan 
modification or to otherwise send notice of her ineligibility.60 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found Wells Fargo’s 
interpretation of the TPP to be suspect because such interpretation 
allowed Wells Fargo to avoid any obligations under the TPP simply 
by refraining from sending borrowers a signed Modification 
Agreement.61 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Wells 
Fargo’s proposed interpretation essentially nullified the express 
promise to send borrowers a signed Modification Agreement if the 
borrower complied with his or her obligations under the TPP.62 The 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (citing Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 56. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883; Wigod, 673 F.3d at 562–63. 
 57. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883; Wigod, 673 F.3d at 563. 
 58. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 564. 
 59. Id. at 562. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 563. 
 62. Id. 
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court also reasoned that adopting Wells Fargo’s reading of the TPP 
would allow loan servicers to refuse permanent modification for 
“any reason whatsoever . . . turning an otherwise straightforward 
offer into an illusion.”63 
Similarly, in Corvello, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “more 
natural and fair” interpretation of the TPP is that loan servicers must 
send borrowers signed Modification Agreements only after 
borrowers meet their obligations, assuming they did not notify 
borrowers of ineligibility.64 Like the court in Wigod, the Ninth 
Circuit held that if Paragraph 2G dictated the parties’ obligations 
under the TPP, it would leave the ultimate decision to offer loan 
modifications to the “unfettered discretion” of Wells Fargo.65 
Instead, the courts in Wigod and Corvello interpreted the borrowers’ 
receipt of the signed Modification Agreements as a condition 
precedent to permanent modifications taking effect.66 In other words, 
the modifications were not complete until the above conditions were 
met.67 Under Paragraph 1 Section 3 of the TPP, however, “Wells 
Fargo still had an obligation to offer [Corvello and the Lucias] a 
permanent modification” if they satisfied their end of the bargains.68 
Wells Fargo countered that Wigod was distinguishable from 
Corvello because—unlike the plaintiff in Wigod—neither Corvello 
nor the Lucias received a signed Modification Agreement. Therefore, 
Wells Fargo argued, under Paragraph 2F, the TPP should have 
terminated if the borrowers did not receive a signed plan and 
Modification Agreement.69 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because the holding in 
Wigod did not turn on the borrowers receiving the signed 
Modification Agreement.70 Rather, the Ninth Circuit noted that under 
the terms of the TPP, when Wells Fargo initiated the borrower’s 
TPP, Wells Fargo had the opportunity to determine the borrower’s 
eligibility for a permanent modification.71 If the borrower did not 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. at 883–84. 
 68. Id. (citing Wigod, 673 F.3d at 563) (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at 884. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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qualify, “[Wells Fargo] could have and should have denied [the 
borrower] a modification on that basis.”72 
Wells Fargo also “contend[ed] that the Lucias’ breach of 
contract claim [could not] survive the statute of frauds because it 
[was] an oral agreement to modify the terms of the mortgage.”73 The 
court rejected this argument and held that, because the Lucias alleged 
full performance of their obligations under the contract, they could 
enforce the remaining promises under the TPP.74 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit concluded that (1) Corvello and the 
Lucias could assert their breach of contract claims against Wells 
Fargo because, under the TPP, loan servicers are obligated to offer 
borrowers permanent mortgage modifications when the borrowers 
have performed their obligations under the TPP; and (2) Wells Fargo 
was engaged in debt collection under California’s Rosenthal Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act.75 The court of appeals reversed the 
district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.76 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Corvello demonstrates a shift 
toward interpreting TPPs in favor of consumers. Corvello advances 
consumer interests in two ways. First, it permits distressed 
homeowners to enforce the terms of the TPP under applicable state 
law, thereby allowing homeowners to hold loan servicers 
accountable to the HAMP Treasury guidelines. Second, it avoids the 
injustice that would result were Wells Fargo allowed to keep 
borrowers’ trial payments without offering anything in exchange, 
and it advances HAMP’s legislative purpose. 
A.  Holding the Door Open for  
HAMP-Related Litigation 
State and federal courts across the United States have uniformly 
held that HAMP does not imply a private right of action.77 Unlike 
 
 72. Id. (quoting Wigod, 673 F.3d at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 885. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 560 n.4 (“We have identified more than 80 other federal cases in 
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federal consumer protection laws, an administrative program such as 
HAMP does not provide an explicit means for holding participating 
loan servicers accountable for their obligations under the 
Supplemental Treasury Guidelines.78 As a result, individual and class 
action lawsuits arising from alleged violations of the Supplemental 
Treasury Guidelines have been widely dismissed. Borrowers have 
little hope, if any, of finding relief in courts.79 Nonetheless, 
distressed borrowers have creatively argued various theories of 
liability in “HAMP-related” actions against loan servicers.80 
Generally, however, such attempts have proven unsuccessful.81 
Corvello strengthens plaintiff-borrowers’ claims in what has 
been coined the “second generation” of HAMP-TPP litigation.82 The 
court’s holding with respect to the Lucias’ claims in Corvello lends 
circuit-level support to the proposition that borrowers may defeat 
servicers’ statute of frauds defense if the borrowers have performed 
their obligations under the TPP.83 Additionally, Corvello further 
expands plausible theories of loan servicer liability by affirming that 
HAMP servicers engage in debt collection, and therefore, Corvello 
provides borrowers additional protection from loan servicers through 
state fair debt collection statutes.84 Accordingly, Corvello will likely 
serve as a launching pad for future HAMP-related claims against 
servicers based on state common law and consumer protection laws. 
Corvello also signals a departure from the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits’ treatment of contract-based TPP claims. For example, in 
Pennington v. HSBC Bank,85 the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the 
 
which mortgagors brought HAMP-related claims. . . . Courts have uniformly rejected these claims 
because HAMP does not create a private federal right of action for borrowers against servicers.”); 
see also John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program and Recent 
Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 194, 197 n.10 (2011) (providing a survey of 
cases holding that there is no private right of action under HAMP). 
 78. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 77, at 197 n.10 (providing a survey of cases holding 
that there is no right of enforcement or action). 
 79. Id. at 197–98; Harry N. Arger, Support for Dismissal of State Law Based HAMP TPP 
Cases, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 2013, at 2. 
 80. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 77, at 197–200 (explaining that in addition to claims based 
on breach of contract and state consumer protection statutes, plaintiffs elsewhere have asserted 
claims based on constitutional challenges, tort law, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act). 
 81. Id.; Arger, supra note 79, at 1–2. 
 82. Arger, supra note 79, at 1. 
 83. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 84. Id. 
 85. 493 F. App’x 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2012). 
CORVELLO V. WELLS FARGO BANK 12/11/2014  10:57 PM 
992 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:981 
 
terms of the TPP agreeement against a servicer in the absence of 
evidence that the servicer signed and returned the Modification 
Agreement to the borrower.86 Corvello therefore revives the rationale 
in Wigod, which the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits refused to follow. 
Similarly, in Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,87 the Eleventh 
Circuit narrowly interpreted a TPP agreement in holding that, under 
the TPP, servicers promise only to “temporarily modify” the loan.88 
The Pennington and Miller courts, however, seemed to reach 
their conclusions without any reference to the plain language in 
Paragraph 1 Section 3 of the TPP, which conditions the offer for 
permanent modification on the borrower’s performance.89 To the 
contrary, the court in Pennington relied primarily on Paragraph 2G to 
support the finding that no contract for permanent modification 
existed “unless and until” the servicer sent the borrower a 
Modification Agreement.90 This was the very argument Wells Fargo 
raised—and that the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected—in Corvello.91 
The interpretations advanced by the courts in Pennington and 
Miller run counter to consumer interests. As noted by the court in 
Corvello, such interpretations inevitably leave loan modifications to 
the unfettered discretion of loan servicers.92 Furthermore, servicers, 
who decide whether to offer such loan modifications, are motivated 
by incentives that favor foreclosure over loan modification.93 
Additionally, loan servicers, unlike lenders or investors, are 
compensated regardless of the performance of the loan.94 These 
conflicting interests suggest that a minimum level of accountability 
 
 86. Id. at 554. 
 87. 677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 88. Id. at 1117. 
 89. See id. at 1116–17 (“Miller . . . lacks standing to pursue his breach of contract, breach of 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel claims insofar as they are 
alleged on an alleged breach of Chase’s HAMP obligations.”); See Pennington, 493 F. App’x at 
554 (holding that there was no enforceable contract between the borrower and servicer because 
the servicer’s failure to send a signed copy of the agreement to the borrower was evidence that the 
lender did not intend to be bound by the TPP). 
 90. Pennington, 493 F. App’x at 555. 
 91. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 92. Id. 
 93. See Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives 
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 761, 770–71 (2011) (arguing that weak 
incentives for servicers to perform modifications cause foreclosures to outpace modifications and 
prevent modifications that would make economic sense for investors). 
 94. See id. at 761, 767–68. 
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on the part of loan servicers is necessary to ensure the just 
administration of HAMP in favor of consumer interests. The holding 
in Corvello creates a threshold level of accountability by imposing 
on loan servicers the obligation to terminate the TPP by notifying 
borrowers of their HAMP eligibility rather than prolonging the TPP 
term indefinitely. Such an obligation preserves servicers’ incentive-
based compensation structure while affording some avenues of 
mortgage relief for borrowers. 
Indeed, the holdings in Wigod and Corvello should not implicate 
servicers that comply with the procedures outlined in the latest MHA 
Servicer Handbook.95 Servicers maintain fiscal safeguards built in to 
HAMP’s federal compensation incentive structure because they are 
not required to offer permanent modifications under HAMP, unless 
the Net Present Value of the loan indicates that it would be more 
profitable to modify the loan than to initiate a foreclosure.96 This, in 
addition to the profits garnered from TARP funds for each offer for 
permanent modification,97 creates a win-win situation for loan 
servicers and the lenders of the underlying mortgages. Accordingly, 
Corvello’s TPP interpretation advances consumer interests, but 
leaves intact the compensation incentives for servicers to offer 





 95. The Supplemental Treasury Guidelines and latest MHA handbook have since abandoned 
the two-step eligibility processes disputed in Pennington and Miller in favor of a one-time 
eligibility determination at the beginning of the TPP process. Section 2.3 of the current MHA 
handbook states that “servicer[s] must send a Borrower Notice to every borrower that has been 
evaluated for HAMP, but is not offered a TPP, is not offered a permanent modification or is at 
risk of losing eligibility for HAMP.” MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 82; see also Arger, supra 
note 79, at 2. 
 96. The Net Present Value (NPV) test is a calculation used by investors and loan servicers to 
determine the value of a mortgage. All loans that meet HAMP eligibility criteria are evaluated 
using a standardized NPV test that compares the NPV of a loan with and without the HAMP 
modification. Servicers must offer a loan modification in circumstances where the modification 
would increase the NPV of a mortgage, but are not required to offer a modification if it would 
decrease the NPV of a mortgage. MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 118–19; see also 
CheckMyNPV.com Frequently Asked Questions, CHECKMYNVP.COM, https://www 
.checkmynpv.com/sites/all/themes/npvtool/pdf/CheckMyNPV-FAQ.pdf (last visited July 27, 
2014). 
 97. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Avoiding Injustice 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach promotes HAMP’s legislative 
purpose—to prevent avoidable foreclosures.98 Corvello’s TPP 
interpretation complements the Treasury’s policy objectives by 
allowing borrowers to enforce their potential rights to mortgage 
relief through the courts. As noted above, Corvello held—at 
minimum—that borrowers could successfully plead a contract-based 
cause of action against loan servicers when the borrower has met his 
or her obligations under the TPP by maintaining accurate financial 
information and making timely payments throughout the term of the 
TPP. This is a significant development because it promotes 
efficiency across the mortgage modification industry. As an 
illustration, loan servicers that neglect to notify borrowers of their 
ineligibility for a permanent loan modification at the end of their trial 
periods, as Wells Fargo did in Corvello, now risk exposure to 
liability under common law.99 Such risk necessarily places some 
limits on the discretion that loan servicers have in deciding whether 
to offer permanent loan modifications. Accordingly, Corvello 
fortifies the underlying policy objectives of HAMP. 
The “natural and fair” interpretation of the TPP endorsed by the 
courts in Corvello and Wigod has since been adopted in the 
Treasury’s most recent MHA Servicer Handbook.100 This handbook, 
which provides uniform programmatic guidance for loan 
modification procedures across the industry, directs loan servicers to 
send signed Modification Agreements “no later than 30 calendar 
days after receipt of the agreement executed by the borrower, and the 
borrower’s compliance with all conditions set forth in the trial period 
plan notice.”101 Imposing such a time constraint avoids the problems 
created when borrowers, like Corvello and the Lucias, are left 
waiting in limbo long after the end of their trial periods. 
 
 98. 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a)(1) (2009). 
 99. See Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 883–85 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 
Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804 (2013) (holding that a plaintiff-
borrower could state a claim for breach of oral contract where the borrower continued to make 
temporary monthly mortgage payments for 10 months and the lender failed to assess the 
feasibility or implement a permanent solution). 
 100. MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 127. 
 101. Id. at 127. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit correctly upheld the validity of 
contract-and common law–based HAMP claims. As HAMP does not 
imply a private right of action, Corvello arms borrowers with a 
much-needed sword by preserving their opportunity to enforce 
contractual rights under the TPP and to seek foreclosure relief in 
courts. By adopting a fair and natural construction of TPP 
agreements, such that borrowers can trigger the loan servicer’s 
obligation to offer permanent modification by satisfying the 
conditions of the TPP, the court has bolstered HAMP’s policy 
objectives and avoided the unjust result of granting loan servicers the 
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